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We appreciate greatly the scholarship and inventive debate stimulated by the authors offering a commentary to our article: False Dawns and 
New Horizons in Patient Safety Research and Practice.1 Each 
commentary engaged critically and imaginatively with the 
main ideas we presented, offering some degree of affirmation 
of our argument, but also taking the discussion in new 
directions, theoretically and empirically. Taken together, 
the commentaries have helped to broaden our thinking in 
relation to patient safety research and practice, and, we hope, 
that of the readers of the Journal. Here, we offer a rejoinder 
to those commentaries and then summarise how, as we read 
their views, they have provided pointers to what we should 
do next.
In their contribution, Andrew Carson-Stevens, Liam 
Donaldson, and Aziz Sheikh2 are largely sympathetic to 
our call for a shift towards incorporating Safety-II thinking 
into patient safety research and practice (focusing on what 
goes right as well as what goes wrong). They make a strong 
case for the ongoing value and continuing salience of some 
Safety-I based approaches (which we also support) and that 
health care leaders should proactively and simultaneously 
seek signals for improvement from unsafe and deficient, but 
also good, everyday care. They contend that the key difficulty 
with existing Safety-I approaches is that few reliable ways have 
been found to strengthen how learning from errors is used 
in health systems to improve quality of care and argue that 
the key challenge is that incident reporting systems capture 
essential information that can inform improvement efforts, 
but have not yet been used to full advantage. 
Rebecca Lawton in her piece echoes the point that 
Safety-I approaches per se should not be blamed for the 
lack of progress in patient safety outcomes, but rather how 
these approaches have so far been operationalised in health 
care organisations and systems.3 Therefore, rather than the 
founding principles of systems thinking being fundamentally 
flawed she highlights that the key problem to address is the 
poor-quality of existing incident investigations and a failure 
to act on the information provided. She warns that unless 
operationalised in the right way, Safety-II may merely serve 
to perpetuate the problems of existing Safety-I approaches by 
focusing on ‘excellent’ practice that others must aspire to, with 
new rules and protocols imposed in an attempt to replicate 
more ‘excellence.’ 
Changing the pace, Kelly Smith and Annette Valenta in their 
commentary caution that the shift from Safety-I to Safety-II 
may be insufficient, in and of itself, to improve patient safety 
outcomes.4 They note that many of those currently working 
in patient safety and quality are formally trained in medicine, 
nursing, law, pharmacy, and healthcare administration, but 
lack training in patient safety. In light of this, they argue that 
the key problem is the absence of a commonly understood 
set of core competencies (knowledge, skills, and attitudes) 
among those working in patient safety; and they further 
maintain that until the field of patient safety unites around 
these competencies and requires certification as a profession, 
neither Safety-I nor Safety-II will reach its full potential.
Mark Sujan’s perspective on patient safety is probably 
closest in spirit to ours.5 He argues that current approaches 
to learning in health organisations only consider the few 
extraordinary situations of systems failure; they are essentially 
focussed, or even obsessed, with things going wrong. He 
contends that while such insights can be useful, they are 
barely adequate to generate a comprehensive understanding 
of safety in complex adaptive systems.6 Drawing inspiration 
from resilient engineering and resilient health care.7-10 He 
argues that we need to study the adaptations that health care 
workers make in their everyday work. In his own research, 
Sujan shows the importance of exploring the narratives that 
staff articulate about their daily “hassles” and how they adapt 
to these problems, all the while continuing to deliver safe 
care. He sees that it is the ability of healthcare workers and 
clinical systems to adapt and to make dynamic trade-offs 
which enable safe care to be delivered in the face of constant 
disturbances, tensions and contradictions, and competing 
organisational priorities. In other words, a Safety-II approach 
to organisational learning enables us to learn about why, most 
of the time, things go right, through the myriad circumstances 
of flexing and adapting in the system. It is this that prevents 
everyday disturbances and disruptions from becoming 
everyday catastrophes. 
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Changing focus yet again, Joanne Travaglia in her 
commentary11 applies a sociological lens, developing the 
notion that if Safety-II is to succeed where Safety-I failed, it 
needs to question not only the ontology, but the epistemology 
and ethics of the patient safety movement. Taking the 
Bourdieusian perspective which she so persuasively applied 
years ago in her doctoral studies, she challenges the taken for 
granted – what Bourdieu would call the doxa of the patient 
safety movement – and takes to task the positioning of the 
current patient safety movement as a natural progression 
from the disciplining of the individual to the disciplining 
of the system. For Travaglia, the continued impact of 
managerial and professional power relations which manifests 
in healthcare generally, and patient safety particularly, must 
be addressed. We share her sentiments, even if we are not so 
sure how to equalise power relations in a system as deeply 
entrenched, political and hierarchical as healthcare. 
Towards a New Research and Practice Agenda
Where, then, does this analysis take us? The commentators 
offer an elaboration of our original article. Some things we 
agree on. There is a universal pact amongst us that the present 
approach, whether or not everyone is happy to label it Safety-I, 
is inadequate. There does seem to be a need to develop better 
systems to capture and spread learning. For Carson-Stevens 
et al this takes the form of incident reporting and learning 
systems, and for Sujan it is organisational learning. Smith 
and Valenta think the right path can be taken with skills 
development, particularly enhanced competencies for all. 
And Lawton, while defending some of the earliest thinkers 
in patient safety who did indeed have a sophisticated view of 
systems and complexity (but many others did not), strongly 
supports a bottom-up approach with involvement of staff and 
patients in a thoroughgoing way. And the caution of Travaglia 
is timely in this era of major political upheaval—that we must 
be mindful that there are deeply encrusted, taken for granted 
power imbalances that are woven tightly into the fabric of 
healthcare organisation and delivery.
Putting this together, a revitalised research agenda, 
designed to strengthen current patient safety approaches, 
might be centrally concerned with systems, organisational 
and individual learning and its associated politics and power 
relations, focused on bottom-up contributions by staff and 
patients who have renewed competencies in both Safety-I and 
Safety-II. 
We see much to like here, but would simply urge all 
researchers to factor in a key point about Safety-II: healthcare 
work is always peppered with distractions and interruptions, 
and much clinical work is about addressing normal, naturally-
occurring everyday troubles. People doing the work (work-
as-done) are in the loop of safety and can make corrections, 
but those prescribing solutions (doing work-as-imagined) are 
not in the loop and cannot correct in real time. This includes 
commentators to this series, policymakers and managers, and 
researchers, too. 
In the end, we cannot stress enough that on-the-ground 
resilient solutions always emerge from workaround 
mechanisms like flexing, adjusting, modifying and fudging. 
So we would like to add to any research agenda that we need 
a more complete understanding of how those working on 
the front lines of care increase their adaptive capacity, handle 
and buffer against cognitive overload, manoeuvre everyday 
difficulties and navigate through complexity, deploying their 
situational awareness to keep patients mostly safe, most of the 
time. We should have as a core to our patient safety activities 
not the top-down admonition to the coalface “this is what you 
need to do” but rather “where are you trying to go and how 
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